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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the growth effects of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European 
Commission, a set of measures and directives that aim to harmonize European financial markets. Using a 
panel of 25 countries and 30 industries, we find that the standard specification predicts harmonization to 
lower growth, though the negative effect is mitigated for industries that depend more on external finance. 
We then show that this seemingly surprising result is due to omitted variable bias. We would expect early 
adopters to bear more of the costs and experience less of the benefits of harmonization. Once we control 
for the relative timing of adoption, harmonization is shown to have a positive effect on growth. This finding 
is robust to including further controls, splitting up the sample into different groups of countries, and 
extending the model to a dynamic setting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union, with the hopes of integrating countries and creating a unified European financial 
market has taken two important measures over the last two decades. The first, well known, measure is of 
course the introduction of the Euro. Since its establishment in 1999, the Euro has not only grown to be a 
leading currency in the world’s financial markets, but has also greatly contributed to unifying European 
financial markets. The second, less well known, measure is the so-called Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP), aimed at harmonizing European financial markets through the imposition and adoption of 
regulatory and legislative frameworks.  
 
With the strategic objectives of ensuring “a single EU market for wholesale financial services”, creating 
“open and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision” and establishing 
“wider conditions for an optimal single financial market”, the FSAP intends to harmonize and reduce the 
costs of cross-border financial intermediation and transactions. (Hartmann et al., 2003, 34; Kalemli – Ozcan 
et al., 2013). The European Commission has argued that financial harmonization, by reducing the cost of 
cross-border financial business, should increase economic growth (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). 
However, no in-depth study of the outcomes of the FSAP has been undertaken. Therefore, an important 
question remains to be examined: how effective have these FSAP measures been on growth across countries 
and industries? This paper aims to answer this question. When analyzing the effect of FSAP on growth, we 
will take an industry perspective. Given that different industries depend on external finance in varying 
degrees, it is likely that the impact of FSAP on growth will be industry-dependent. We therefore examine 
the effects of financial harmonization policies of the FSAP on industrial growth in a panel of twenty five 
EU member states and thirty industries for the period of 1971 – 2007.  
 
Based on the view of the European Commission, we would expect harmonization to have a positive impact 
on growth rates across industries and countries. In contrast, when regressing growth on financial 
harmonization, we find a negative impact. However, we do find the negative effect to be mitigated in 
industries that depend more on external finance. In principle, the negative effect of harmonization on growth 
may be due to different reasons. First, while harmonization may refer to integration, thus lowering the cost 
of cross-country financial activity, it may also refer to uniformity, often implying adoption costs without 
clear benefits. For example, Boyfield et al. (2006) have reported that the additional costs faced by the British 
economy after the implementation of the FSAP measures amounted to more than 14 billion pounds. We 
therefore classify the different directives of the FSAP into those that mainly are aimed towards uniformity, 
those that are mainly aimed towards integration, and those that do not fall under either category. Consistent 
with our prior, the directives that focus on uniformity continue to have a significant negative effect, while 
those that focus on integration cease to have a significant effect.  
 
Second, the timing in the adoption of the FSAP directives may be crucial in determining their effects on 
growth. In particular, being an early adopter may not be advantageous, because the country would bear the 
costs of adoption, without reaping the benefits of harmonization, since the other countries would be lagging 
behind. Controlling for the relative timing of adoption in our estimations, we find that harmonization now 
has a beneficial effect on growth. In addition, we find evidence of early adoption having a negative impact 
on growth. We then carry out a number of robustness checks to examine whether our main result --- 
harmonization having a positive effect on growth and the relative timing of adoption having a negative 
effect --- holds up. The results are mostly robust to splitting up our sample into EU-15, Euro and non-EU 
15 countries, and to introducing additional control variables, such as legal and governmental measures, and 
financial and stock market development indicators. We lastly analyze the consistency of our benchmark 
model through the use of a dynamic panel GMM model. The dynamic Arellano – Bond model derives 
similar conclusions reporting that harmonization is positively significant on industrial growth when the 
harmonization difference measure is included in the estimations. 
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Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First is the literature that has examined the effect 
of deregulation on growth and volatility. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1997) and Strahan 
(2002) study the impact of branching deregulation and interstate banking on growth. The results reveal that 
following state-level branching deregulation, real per-capita economic growth across the U.S. states 
increased significantly. Policy changes that allow for higher integration, better bank monitoring and 
screening across states are found to be a possible explanation. In a more recent study, De Avila (2003), 
examining the effects of financial deregulation in Europe, shows that the process of capital control lifting 
and the harmonization of banking laws have enhanced the growth rates of European economies. 
Harmonization is found to be beneficial for growth through the increase in the level and efficiency of 
financial intermediation, whereas the liberalization of capital controls increased growth through 
improvements in financial intermediation. Different from our study, De Avila (2003) is limited to a cross-
country analysis, therefore not taking into account cross-industrial variation. In addition, his focus is on the 
European Commission directives on banking integration that were established prior to the FSAP.  
 
Second is the literature that has analyzed the link between external finance dependence and growth. An 
important paper is Rajan and Zingales (1998) which studies the role of external finance on industrial growth. 
The authors find financial development to be an influential factor on the rate of growth of industries by 
reducing the cost of external finance. This effect is especially stronger in those firms with greater financial 
dependence. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries which require higher levels of external finance 
develop faster in countries with more established financial markets. Similarly, Gupta and Yuan (2003), 
using the Rajan and Zingales external finance dependence measure, demonstrate that stock market 
liberalizations lead to higher growth rates in industries that depend more heavily on external finance. Given 
this evidence, we are interested in seeing whether the benefits of financial harmonization are greater in 
those industries with greater external finance dependence. Our analysis thereby brings together the 
literatures on financial deregulation and external finance dependence.  
 
Third, there are some papers that have studied the FSAP measures. Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2013) analyze 
the link between financial integration and business cycle synchronization. The authors’ analysis, using 
bilateral panel instrumental variables to link legislative harmonization policies to output synchronization, 
depicts a negative relationship for the country-pairs selected in the sample. In an attempt to examine the 
Euro’s effect on financial integration Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2010) reveal the legislative-regulatory 
harmonization policies in financial markets established under the FSAP to be a contributing factor for cross-
border lending, despite these policies’ inability to explain the Euro’s impact on financial integration. 
Neither of these papers assesses the impact on growth, and neither uses industrial data.  
 
Compared to the existing literature, one important finding is that controlling for the relative timing of 
adoption is essential. Clearly, adopting harmonization measures when others do not, does not amount to 
true harmonization. We would expect early adopters to face more of the costs and less of the benefits in 
comparison to late adopters. Our results indicate that not controlling for the relative timing of adoption 
leads to a serious omitted variable bias. Indeed, failing to control for this important variable changes the 
impact of harmonization on growth from positive to negative.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain in detail our data. Section 3 
provides a discussion of the empirical model. Section 4 depicts our results and some robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data 
 
The data used in this paper come from a variety of sources. Our panel consists of annual industry-level data 
from twenty-five European economies over the period 1970 – 2007. The countries used in our analysis are 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.1 Below we discuss the indicators employed in the 
analysis in further detail. 
 
2.1. Measure of Industrial Growth 
 
The industrial data for growth come from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts dataset.  This 
dataset provides industrial data for 25 EU member countries for 107 different industries (sectors). Having 
industry-level data is essential for exploiting cross-industrial variation in external finance dependence, 
while having cross-country variation is important in identifying the effects of harmonization on growth. 
The time period covered in the EU KLEMS dataset is 1970 – 2007 for EU 15 countries and 1995 – 2007 
for 10 new EU member states. From the EU KLEMS dataset we use gross value added in constant Euros.2 
Gross value added growth in country i, industry s, and time t, is defined as: 
 
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = log  (𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) 
 
where 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is gross value added in country i, industry s, and time t.
3 
 
2.2. Measure of Financial Harmonization 
 
Harmonization measures used in our analysis are based on the information from the Financial Services 
Action Plan. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was launched by the European Union and the 
European Commission at the end of 1998 as a major 5-year program with the goals of establishing “a single 
EU wholesale market for financial services, open and secure retail markets, and state-of-the-art prudential 
and supervisory regulations.” (Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2010, 79). A single wholesale market should in 
principle allow for higher levels of finance to be raised across the EU, while open and secure retail financial 
services markets should provide customers with a safer and cheaper integrated financial market that reduces 
charges on cross-border payments, removes barriers to retail financial services, and allows a larger scale of 
electronic commerce to take place across the EU (HM Treasury, The Financial Services Authority, and the 
Bank of England, 2004). State-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision, on the other hand, should offer 
faster changes in the regulatory environment that benefit customers in financial services.  
 
                                                          
1 Our panel has three dimensions; countries (i), industries (sectors) (s), and time (t). We, therefore, have i*s*t, i.e. 
25*107*37 = 98975 observations. Due to missing observations for the external finance measure of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) we drop some sectors from our analysis. Thus, most of our regressions are estimated with a sample 
of 17380 observations. 
2 For the time period before the introduction of the Euro, the EU KLEMS uses the 1999 official fixed Euro exchange 
rates of the Euro countries to convert local currencies into Euros. Consistent with this, for the non-Euro countries for 
the time period before the introduction of the Euro, we take the 1999 official fixed Euro exchange rates with the 
local currencies to convert them into Euros. For further information please refer to Table 1 in the Supplementary 
Appendix which can be found at: 
http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/51429799/supplementary%20appendix%20december%202012.pdf  
3 While most of the growth literature focuses on log differences to approximate growth rates, the deregulation 
literature often uses the direct ratio of 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡/𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1. We have experimented with this alternative measure, and 
the results do not qualitatively change.   
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Broadly speaking, the FSAP is aimed at removing barriers to entry into the financial sector, increasing 
competition, and harmonizing information (Malcolm et al., 2009). However, just like any other legislative 
measure taken at the country level, the FSAP comes with costs and benefits. Boyfield et al. (2006) state 
that the benefits involve increasing investment opportunities in securities markets across borders, easing 
the framework for investment firms, augmenting internalization, stimulating competition between banks 
and thereby reducing the cost of trading and the cost of capital, increasing investor confidence, market 
liquidity, and free flow of capital, allowing for more transparency, and greater competition. The costs on 
the other hand entail compliance costs due to complexity, possibility of creating barriers to entry for smaller 
firms, further costs that involve execution of the directives, and costs of implementation of these directives 
across countries. The goal of the European Commission through the FSAP is to form a unified financial 
market that can act as an essential element for growth, employment and improved competition in the overall 
European system (European Commission, 2005). If so, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) should 
have had a positive impact on growth, and one of the aims of this study is to explore whether this is indeed 
the case.  
 
The FSAP consists of 29 legislative acts, 27 directives and 2 regulations in corporate law, banking, payment 
systems and corporate governance (Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2013). The most important of these are the 27 
directives, which will be the focus of the remainder of our analysis. The directives amend previous laws, 
replace out-of-date proposals or offer new legislative measures for the EU member countries. Since the 
establishment of the FSAP in 1998, the European Commission has passed 21 out of the 27 directives by the 
end of 2003, with the remaining 6 directives being passed into legislation during the period of 2004 – 2006 
(Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2013).  
 
Unlike the EU regulations that are enforceable across countries immediately after their announcement, the 
FSAP directives are enforceable only after the member states pass legislations that adopt the EU law 
domestically (Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2013). The implementation stage of the FSAP directives involves the 
European Commission’s proposal on legislative directives and regulations, which then will have to be 
adopted by “co-decision” of the Council of Ministers of the Member States and the European Parliament 
(HM Treasury, The Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of England, 2003). The FSAP directives 
are incorporated into the national law of each EU member state either through introduction or through 
amendment of national laws within a time frame of 18 to 24 months of their date of original publication. 
The implementation process of the FSAP directives works through three stages; transposition of the EU 
legislation into national law, adjustment for necessary arrangements and ensuring that the newly adopted 
regulations are working effectively and efficiently. Due to differences across countries in modifying their 
existing internal institutional structures and frameworks to adopt the EU law (and due to the discretion in 
when to adopt these directives), the transposition of the FSAP directives may take several years, creating 
variation in terms of the dates of implementation of these directives in different countries.4 For example, 
the 1998 Settlement Finality Directive (1998/26/EC) of the FSAP under the securities category was 
implemented into domestic law in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the U.K. within a year of its circulation. However, France, Italy and Luxembourg did not adopt this directive 
until 2001, while Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had not transposed the 
                                                          
4 The member states are given a time frame to transpose the directives into national law. However, some countries 
do not follow the timing of the FSAP directives that is set by the European Commission. This could occur due to 
parliamentary delays, oppositions from firms and businesses within the countries, difficulty in removal or alteration 
of existing laws, and possible technical obstacles. There are sanctions, however, to ensure compliance of the 
member states with the adoption of the directives. By the former Article 171 (now Article 228) of the European 
Treaty and Article 143 of the Euratom Treaty the European Commission can impose tailored sanctions depending on 
the severity of non-compliance of the Member States with the rules and regulations. For more information please 
refer to the European Commission’s Application of EU Law website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_260_en.htm  
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directive till the end of our sample period (Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2010 & 2013).5 It is this cross-country 
variation in the timing of the adoption of different directives which will allow us to identify their effect on 
growth.   
 
We assemble harmonization indices for EU countries using adoption dates of different directives in 
different countries from the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan. Following the 
methodology by Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2010), we construct country and time-variant and industry-
invariant indices of harmonization that summarize the information provided by the 27 FSAP directives. In 
particular, for each of the 27 directives listed under the FSAP we define a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one on and after the date that the country under examination has transposed the directive into 
national law and a value of zero otherwise.  We sum all 27 directives to create our next variable, lexi,t 
(Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 2010 & 2013): 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
27
𝑘=1
 
 
We construct our financial harmonization index by: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) 
 
where k represents all 27 directive dummies, i represents the countries, and t represents the years in the 
sample. Following Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2010), we use the logarithmic transformation of the sum of the 
directives for countries. For robustness we construct two different indices that include the initial twenty-
one directives that were put into force by the European Commission before the official completion of the 
FSAP, and the six directives that correspond to the banking initiatives of the FSAP (Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 
2010).6 Table 2 in the Supplementary Appendix provides a time-line of adoption of the 27 directives for all 
countries in our sample, while Table 3 presents the descriptions and categories for these directives.  
 
2.3. Measure of External Finance Dependence 
 
One of the aims of our model is to examine how the effect of harmonization on growth is mediated by an 
industry’s dependence on external finance. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we take a measure of an 
industry’s dependence on external funds in the U.S. and apply it to our European sample. The external 
finance dependence measure is calculated by computing the external financing needs of U.S. companies 
during 1970s using data from Compustat. It exclusively concentrates on the amount of desired investment 
that cannot be financed through internal cash flows within the same company. The external finance 
dependence measure for a firm is constructed as: 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡
 
                                                          
5 Please refer to Tables 3 and 6 in the Supplementary Appendix for further explanation of the directives in the 
Financial Services Action Plan. The Supplementary Appendix can be found at: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx6ZXluZXBvemtva3xneDpiYj
M5OTVjNTFlNWQ3Njg  
6 The first alternative harmonization index which includes twenty one directives excludes the directives 
implemented prior to 2004. It is constructed as: 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘21
𝑘=1  and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ = ln (1 +
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡). The second alternative to the harmonization index highlights the importance of the 7 banking directives of 
the FSAP. The banking harmonization index is then formed as: 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘7
𝑘=1  and 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ = ln (1 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡). 
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where 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 is the external finance dependence measure, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠,𝑡 is capital expenditures, and 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑠,𝑡  
is cash flow from operations of a firm in industry s. In order to obtain the firm’s overall dependence on 
external finance in 1970s Rajan and Zingales sum the external finance measure over 10 years (from 1970 
to 1980) and divide it by the sum of capital expenditures over the same period. To obtain a measure of 
finance dependence at the sectoral level, 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the industry median. By doing 
so, they reduce the effects of outliers and temporal fluctuations.  
 
Applying the U.S. industry measures of external finance dependence to the corresponding European 
industries is reasonable if, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), there is a technological reason for why 
some industries depend more on external finance than others. That is, if the machinery industry requires a 
larger initial scale and a longer period of gestation before the admittance of cash flows into the sector, in 
comparison to the textile industry in the U.S., this would also be true for the two industries in France (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998). With the assumption that these technological differences are similar across countries, 
the Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance dependence can be used for different countries. 
 
We use the external finance measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998) for two additional reasons.7 Firstly, we 
rely our analysis on a well cited paper by Rajan and Zingales. Secondly, if we were to use country-specific 
measures of finance dependence for Europe, there would be an issue of endogeneity, because growth may 
affect external dependence. By using the U.S. measure, external finance dependence becomes exogenous 
to the growth process of different European countries. 
 
There is, nonetheless, a drawback of using this measure. Our sample includes a larger group of industries 
than what the Rajan and Zingales measure captures.8 Although this leads to the exclusion of some industries 
from our estimations, we have no reason to believe that it substantially alters our results.  
 
2.4. Interaction term of the harmonization index and external finance dependence 
 
Given our harmonization index and the external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
we construct our interaction term which will help us to identify the simultaneous effect of harmonization 
and external finance dependence on growth as follows: 
 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where i represents the countries, s represents the industries, t represents the years in the 
sample,9 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index constructed using the directives of the FSAP and  
𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 is the industry-variant external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales.  
 
With the interaction term that has country, industry and time variability, we account for the effects of 
harmonization on industries that require external financing on growth rates.  
 
 
                                                          
7 A number of studies in the literature employ the Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance due to its 
exogeneity.  Gupta and Yuan (2003), (2009), Claessens and Laeven (2005), Guiso et al. (2004), Cetorelli (2001) and 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) are some examples. 
8 The Rajan and Zingales measure of external finance dependence is based on the information obtained using mostly 
manufacturing sectors. Table 5 in the Supplementary Appendix presents correspondences of industries in our 
analysis to the ones in Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
9 Similarly for robustness checks we construct two additional interaction terms that depend on the different 
harmonization indices, i.e.  (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 and (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
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2.5. Other control variables 
 
In order to thoroughly examine the relationship between financial harmonization and industrial growth, 
there may be a need to control for a number of legal and institutional variables, as well as financial and 
stock market development indicators. Control variables described in detail below are country and time-
variant and cover the period of 1996 – 2007. 
 
We employ a series of legal and institutional variables from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators dataset. We use three different measures to control for institutional, legal, political and economic 
factors that may affect the overall level of growth. The three indicators --- government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law --- are constructed using subjective and perceptions-based data that 
reflect views of a range of respondents, agencies and organizations. They are measured in a range from -
2.5 to 2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.10  
 
To measure financial development we employ the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit 
money bank assets and central bank assets from Beck et al. (2000) Financial Development and Structure 
Database. This variable demonstrates the weight of deposit money bank assets among total assets and 
indicates the importance of private lending. For stock market development we make use of stock market 
turnover ratio also from the Financial Development and Structure Database. This variable is measured as 
the ratio of the value of total shares traded to stock market capitalization and depicts the efficiency of stock 
markets in transaction.  
 
Control variables help in further explaining the effect of harmonization on industrial growth. The timing of 
implementation of harmonization policies could be driven by the state of financial and stock market 
developments across countries. The ease in adopting FSAP directives into national law can be induced by 
the quality of regulatory and legislative institutions. In order to control for these potential influences, to 
verify the robustness of our benchmark model, to analyze the possibility of extending our model to a 
dynamic one, and to account for factors that may not be fully encountered in a fixed effects setting, we 
include the variables discussed above. 
 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
 
Our analysis is based on a model that measures the effects of financial harmonization and external finance 
dependence on industrial growth. We follow the literature (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), (1997), Strahan 
(2002), Morgan et al. (2004), and Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2010 & 2013)) and use a model which assumes 
that the effects of harmonization and external finance dependence will impact growth not only through the 
harmonization index but also through the interaction term.11 Our benchmark model will control for average 
differences across countries and time in harmonization policies and across industries in external finance 
dependence. It will allow us to analyze the influence of harmonization policies through the index measure 
and through the interaction term separately.  
 
                                                          
10 Please refer to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. 1996 – 2011. World Bank. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. The institutional quality variables used in our analysis 
do not fluctuate widely across time. Due to the relatively small fluctuation structure of these indicators, we take the 
averages of two consecutive years to replace the missing years’ data for these three legal/institutional variables. 
11 We extend our benchmark model into an Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel data model to control for issues 
regarding endogeneity and autocorrelation.  
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We present a benchmark model to measure the effect of external finance dependence and financial 
harmonization on industrial growth across countries and over time.  
 
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where the dependent variable in the above equation is gross value added growth, 𝜆𝑖 represents country fixed 
effects, 𝜇𝑠 represents industry fixed effects, 𝜃𝑡 represents time fixed effects, 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 is the lagged 
logarithm of gross value added in levels, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the index measure created using the FSAP 
directives,  and the interaction term is the product of the financial harmonization index and the external 
finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales.12 
 
In the above equation our main focus is on the coefficients of the harmonization index and the interaction 
term. We would expect to find positive and significant coefficients for both terms which would imply a 
positive effect of financial harmonization and financial deepening (measured by external finance 
dependence) on gross value added growth. Our analysis is based on the examination of how much industries 
benefit in terms of growth from harmonization of financial markets within the EU given that these industries 
require external finance. Similar to the work presented in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we can make 
predictions about within country differences between industries and across time using an interaction term 
that reveals time, country and industry specifics. This method allows correcting for country, industry, and 
time characteristics and avoids any potential omitted variable bias and model specification (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998).  
 
Although the literature (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), (1997), Strahan (2002), and Kalemli – Ozcan et al., 
2010) does not suggest the use of a dynamic model, there are studies that examine whether the results of 
the benchmark model correspond to those using instruments in estimations. In our benchmark setting, there 
may also be concerns regarding the effect of anticipation of financial harmonization policies. That is, 
countries may initiate adopting harmonization measures with hopes of enhancing growth. In order to 
account for this possibility, we extend our analysis to include a dynamic specification. Using a dynamic 
setting, we can calculate the speed of adjustment of the harmonization policies as well as accounting for 
long-run effects of the variables in our model.  The dynamic panel data model used in our analysis is 
specified as follows13:  
 
∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛾∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 + ∆𝜏𝑡+ 𝛼1∆𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼2(∆𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × ∆𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠)𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑘∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑘
6
𝑘=1
+ ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 
 
where 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the country, industry and time-variant gross value added growth, 𝜏𝑡 represents the 
time fixed effects, 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of the FSAP measures, the interaction 
term is the  product of the harmonization index and external finance dependence measure of Rajan and 
Zingales, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 are control variables for harmonization differences, financial and stock market 
                                                          
12 The above model in levels with fixed effects is consistent when 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) = 0. This implies lag of 
gross value added to have no correlation with the lag of the error term. This does not however suggest lagged growth 
rate to be uncorrelated with the lagged error term. That is, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1, 𝑣𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) ≠ 0. This assumption is sufficient 
to guarantee the efficiency of our benchmark model. 
13 We include time dummies in our dynamic panel data model to account for possible trends. Time dummies are also 
used as IV type instruments in the dynamic panel data model estimations. 
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development, and legal and institutional measures that are country and time-variant. As before, we would 
expect to find positive values for both 𝛼1 and 𝛼2.  
 
The above model no longer has country or industry specific effects, the dynamic panel data model accounts 
for these individual effects. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model takes the first differences of all 
terms in order to elude the Nickell bias that occurs when the lagged dependent variable is correlated with 
the error term. The moment conditions that stem from the above model require that: 
 
𝐸[𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−𝑘∆𝑢𝑖,𝑠,𝑡] = 0 for ∀𝑘 ≥ 2 
 
With this condition the lagged dependent variable of gross value added growth is guaranteed to be 
uncorrelated with the first difference of the error term even though the first difference of the dependent 
variable could indeed be correlated with the first difference of the error term.  
 
By using one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, we allow gross value added growth rates across 
European countries to partially adjust to their long-run equilibrium value within one year. First differences 
in the dynamic data model wipe out country and industry-variant and time-invariant specific effects. The 
dynamic panel data model thereby avoids any potential correlation of possible fixed effects with the right 
hand side regressors. We convey our main findings for both the benchmark and dynamic panel data models 
in detail in the next section. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
We report our results using 25 EU member countries for 1971 – 2007. In our regressions with the 
benchmark model we use fixed effects estimations with country, industry, and time specific effects, whereas 
for the dynamic panel data model we use the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel specification. 
 
4.1. Benchmark model  
 
The results from Table 1 illustrate the effects of the harmonization index and the interaction term on gross 
value added growth in a fixed effects estimation with country, industry, and time effects. We would expect 
to find a positive effect of financial harmonization and the interaction term on growth. Previous discussions 
had conveyed that through the Financial Services Action Plan, European economies would achieve an 
increase in the real GDP by 1.1% over a decade (FSA, 2003; London Economics, 2002). However, columns 
(1) – (3) of Table 114, each using a different harmonization index depending on the number of directives 
included, report negative coefficients for harmonization on gross value added growth.15 This implies that 
as countries adopt the directives of the FSAP, industrial growth becomes negatively impacted directly by 
the process of financial harmonization. Although the negative impact is only statistically significant for 
banking integration directives in column (3), this finding clearly runs counter to our initial expectations. 
The aim of the FSAP is to create policies that will be implemented by member countries to achieve an 
optimal single financial market. Nevertheless, interaction terms constructed using different financial 
                                                          
14 In this benchmark specification we do not control for other covariates; the inclusion of country, industry and time 
fixed effects accounts for most of the usual control variables used in standard growth regressions. We introduce 
further controls to our model in later specifications. 
15 The t-statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Country and industry clustering allows to control for errors that can be correlated across countries 
within an industry, and across industries within a country, as well as providing standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Using clustering in a fixed effects model thereby gives a consistent estimation of a panel with 
cluster-variance while controlling for endogeneity.  
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harmonization indices, are found to be positive and significant. They convey that the additional need for 
external finance dependence along with the adoption of harmonization policies bring an enhancement to 
growth. The lagged values of gross value added are shown to be negatively significant in all columns 
complying with our initial expectations that European countries experience slower growth perspectives in 
upcoming years.  
 
Given that harmonization has a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect (through the interaction 
term), we move on to calculating the total effects of harmonization. This can be done by using the following 
partial derivative: 
 
𝜕𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑓𝑠 
 
Since our primary concern is on the impact of harmonization policies implemented through the FSAP, we 
observe total effects using the above equation. Examining the summary statistics reported in Table 4 in the 
Supplementary Appendix and the coefficients from the first column of Table 1, we calculate that at the 
mean level of external finance dependence, the partial derivative of gross value added growth across 
industries with respect to the harmonization index is equal to -0.0094. At the minimum level of external 
finance dependence, the partial derivative takes on a value of -0.0148, whereas at the maximum level of 
external finance dependence, the partial derivative is -0.0027. The results show that the total effect of 
harmonization policies is negative for growth. The positive interaction terms simply convey that the 
negative effect of harmonization policies is somewhat mitigated in industries with higher external finance 
dependence. The coefficient of harmonization from column (3) of banking directives implies that growth 
across countries and industries has decreased by 2 % after the implementation of the FSAP directives (exp 
(-0.025) =0.9753). 
 
Taken together, our results are puzzling. The negative effect of harmonization, particularly that of the 
banking directives, on industrial growth is difficult to explain given the initial objectives of the FSAP. Our 
findings demonstrate that the effect of the FSAP directives on growth is not as beneficial as the policy 
makers had initially expected. These findings could be due to different factors. 
 
Integration versus uniformity  
 
A first possibility is that not all these directives served to reduce costs through market integration. 
Harmonization is a broad term that could capture different realities. On the one hand, harmonization could 
refer to integration, thus lowering the cost of cross-border financial activity. On the other hand, 
harmonization could simply mean uniformity, without necessarily implying the lowering of costs. We 
therefore take the directives and classify them into three groups: those that imply integration, those that 
imply uniformity, and those that fall under the others category. The first category of directives, those that 
promote integration, is made up of directives which aim to improve the efficiency of payments, eliminate 
tax distortions, simplify regulation, create a single passport for securities, increase competition, remove 
barriers and restrictions, expand investment options and reduce the cost of capital. The main goal of this 
category of directives is to lower the costs of cross-border financial activity. The second category of 
directives, those that promote uniformity, seeks to improve risk management, harmonize cross-border 
supervision, encourage innovation, improve prudential regulation and rules, and increase consumer 
confidence and protection. Although these directives may also contribute to removing some restrictions, 
they are more aimed towards making rules and regulation more uniform, and often involve increasing the 
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costs of cross-border financial activity.16 The third category consists of all other directives which are not 
easily classifiable under the two former categories.17 
 
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 2 report the same specification as Table 1, but employ a different harmonization 
index for each of the three categories of directives. Using the same indexing strategy as discussed earlier, 
the findings demonstrate that the uniformity index has a negative impact on industrial growth. Both 
integration and others indices are not found to be significant. This result shows that not all harmonization 
is the same: harmonization that effectively improves market integration ceases to have a significant negative 
impact, whereas harmonization which is mainly aimed at making countries “similar” continues to have a 
negative effect on growth. Including the effect of the interaction term reinforces this dichotomy, as it is 
found to be positively significant for those directives that promote integration, whereas it is insignificant 
for those directives that promote uniformity for the industries with higher dependence on external funds. 
Taken together, this suggests that harmonization thought of as integration has an overall positive effect18, 
whereas harmonization thought of as uniformity has an overall negative effect on industrial growth. More 
broadly speaking, some directives may lower the cost of cross-border financial activity, whereas others may 
increase it. Grouping all directives together under the common wording of “harmonization” may thus be 
misleading. 
 
EU-15 versus the rest 
 
A second possibility for the negative effect of harmonization in our benchmark specification is that the new 
member states of the EU exhibit different behavior from the original EU-15 members, and that this 
difference is not adequately picked up by the country-fixed effects. One of the biggest criticisms for the 
FSAP measures is that they have been implemented without further consideration of the structural basis of 
integration in securities, retail and financial markets across the EU.19 This suggests that the FSAP measures 
may not be as effective in markets that are not completely integrated.  Truly integrated markets should in 
fact benefit from financial harmonization through the reduction in costs of investment, enhancements in 
consumer protection, improvements in allocation of investment resources, and innovation. However, 
without a well-integrated financial market, financial harmonization policies could only provide small 
benefits to EU member countries.  
 
We thereby believe that EU-15 countries which have been a part of the union for a longer period of time 
may have a different response to the implementation of the FSAP policies in comparison to newer members 
of the EU. Similarly being a part of a monetary union might have an additional influence on growth. Another 
issue is that the FSAP was largely negotiated when the new member states were not yet a part of the EU, 
raising the possibility that their specific needs were not sufficiently taken into account. If so, we would 
expect the effect of financial harmonization to have a positive impact on the growth rate of EU-15 countries, 
unlike the negative effect that is depicted for the entire sample. 
 
In order to further analyze this issue, we divide our sample set into subgroups. In column (4) of Table 2 we 
report the results for the EU-15 countries. Column (4) shows that the harmonization index is in fact 
positively significant. This implies that for EU-15 countries financial harmonization has a positive impact 
                                                          
16 Increasing costs refer to mostly cost of compliance and capital costs that are born on investors and issuers across 
countries.  
17 Note that the classification of the directives under each category can be regarded as being subjective. However, 
the main goal through this analysis is to examine whether the effect of financial harmonization on industrial growth 
is amplified when directives that aim to implement similar objectives are grouped together under an index.  
18 The positive effect of integration directives holds for industries that have a higher dependence (at the maximum 
level) on external finance, in other words, at the maximum level of external finance dependence, harmonization that 
implies integration has a positive impact on industrial growth. 
19 Please refer to Alexander (2002). 
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on industrial growth. In column (5) we examine the case with Euro countries. In the Euro countries the 
effects of financial harmonization should be enhanced due to the existence of a monetary union. Consistent 
with this view, in column (5), we find that the harmonization index is not only positive but also very 
significant. Lastly column (6) shows that for the case of non-EU 15 countries the effect of financial 
harmonization is negative. The interaction terms are positive but not significant in any of the regressions 
reported in columns (4) to (6). Overall, this suggests that the Euro and the EU-15 countries benefitted the 
most, whereas the new member states seem to have suffered a negative effect from the FSAP.20  
 
Relative timing (speed) of adoption 
 
A third possibility for our initial finding of a negative effect of harmonization on growth might be related 
to the relative timing of adoption. For example, if Czech Republic adopts a directive, and no other country 
adopts the same directive, then we cannot talk about harmonization. In that case Czech Republic would 
simply bear the cost of adopting the directive, without attaining any benefits from it. Not controlling for 
this would introduce a bias. Given that there exist significant differences across EU member countries in 
the timing of adoption, this is a potential issue. Recall that the FSAP directives need to be transposed into 
national law before they become effective. This has to be done within a specified period of time, but some 
countries do so faster than others.  
With this in mind, we consider whether there is a disadvantage from adopting these directives earlier. In 
order to check for this possibility, we construct a new variable which we call the harmonization difference: 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the harmonization index of country i in year t, and 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is 
the average index of harmonization across countries in year t. The harmonization difference is a measure 
that depicts how many FSAP directives are adopted by each country relative to the average rate of adoption 
for all countries per year. Using this variable we can analyze the impact of being an early versus a late 
adopter on industrial growth. Column (7) of Table 2 reports the results when this new variable is included 
in our full sample. As expected, our findings show that there is a negative effect of being an early adopter. 
The interpretation of this result is as follows: the FSAP directives aim to unify financial markets across the 
EU. However, this could only be mutually beneficial for countries when they all implement these directives.  
 
More importantly, once we control for the harmonization the difference, the harmonization index is now 
positive and significant. The positive effect of harmonization is carried through both the harmonization 
index and the interaction term which imply that the growing need of external finance, together with the 
ongoing process of transposition of the directives brings an enhancement to industrial growth. With the 
inclusion of the harmonization difference measure, the harmonization index acts like an average 
harmonization indicator that generates the impact of harmonization across countries at the average level.  
 
Figure 1 shows details of the harmonization process for 25 countries in our sample. The harmonization 
process in EU-15 countries proceeded gradually, whereas for new EU member countries it happened more 
suddenly in big jumps. As a result, the difference between the harmonization index and the average 
harmonization per year is largest for the non-EU 15 countries. In order to further investigate this, we split 
our sample into EU-15 countries, Euro countries and non-EU 15 countries. 
 
Table 3 presents our findings for three different samples. Column (1) reports the results for EU-15 countries. 
The harmonization index is found to be positively significant implying that the adoption of the FSAP 
                                                          
20 We have also checked for the influence of the Euro’s effect on industrial growth rates by including a euro dummy 
in our estimations. The results reported in the Supplementary Appendix show that the euro dummy is not significant 
in our analysis. 
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directives by EU-15 countries augments growth. The coefficient on the harmonization difference measure 
is negative but not significant indicating that being an early adopter does not have a clear negative effect 
on industrial growth. Similarly the harmonization index is found to be positive and significant and the 
harmonization difference measure negative but insignificant for Euro countries in column (2). Interaction 
terms in both columns demonstrate that for EU-15 and Euro countries the effects of harmonization do not 
appear stronger for industries that the depend more on external finance, the coefficients being statistically 
insignificant.21 Column (3) depicts the results for non-EU 15 countries. Harmonization index is no longer 
significant whereas the harmonization difference is negatively significant suggesting that among the non-
EU 15 countries it is clearly more beneficial to be a late adopter than an early one.  
 
Taken together, our results imply that, once we control for the relative timing of adoption, harmonization 
has a positive effect on growth, though that effect is not always statistically significant. The sign of the 
harmonization index changes conditional on the inclusion of the harmonization difference measure that 
accounts for the relative timing of adoption. As for being an early adopter, our results show that this is true 
for all cases, but only statistically significant for the non-EU 15 countries, and for the entire sample.  
 
Exclusion of some countries 
 
A fourth possibility for our initial finding might be the result of the bias introduced by the inclusion of some 
countries in our sample. Figure 1 demonstrates that there are two countries which require closer analysis. 
Latvia and Poland seem to have adopted some FSAP directives much earlier than other non-EU 15 
countries. In fact, the data from the European Commission suggest that they adopted some of these measures 
much before becoming part of the EU. This could potentially be the result of the amendment of some 
existing directives that had already been transposed into domestic law prior to the implementation of the 
Financial Services Action Plan. In order to verify whether these two countries create any biases for the 
effects of harmonization on industrial growth, we exclude them from our sample and reanalyze our 
benchmark model. The results in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 are similar to those reported in Tables 1 
and 2. Harmonization index is still found to be negatively influential on growth rates when we exclude 
Latvia and Poland from our sample. Once again, the inclusion of the harmonization difference measure 
causes the harmonization index to become positively significant, indicating that harmonization is beneficial 
for growth, but that being an early adopter is not.  
 
We also examine the sensitivity of our results when we exclude four countries that might bring potential 
biases due to their large share of foreign banks and liabilities. In order to observe whether the effects of 
external finance dependence of industries and the enhancement of harmonization policies on industrial 
growth are triggered by the inclusion of countries with greater banking shares, we exclude Cyprus, Malta, 
Luxembourg and the U.K. from our estimations. Column (6) depicts insignificant effects for the 
harmonization index and the interaction term. In column (7) the harmonization index is found to be 
positively significant and the harmonization difference measure negatively significant which correspond to 
the results found in column (7) of Table 2, implying that the exclusion of countries with a larger share of 
foreign banks and liabilities does not alter our main findings. 
 
Competing explanations 
 
So far we have conveyed four reasons for why we observe a negative relationship between financial 
harmonization following the FSAP policies and industrial growth rates across European countries. A 
negative relationship could occur as a result of harmonization capturing different realities such as 
integration and uniformity, as a result of the FSAP policies aiming to create benefits for those that have 
                                                          
21 At the mean level of external finance dependence across industries, the total effect of harmonization for EU-15 
and Euro countries is found to be positive. The total effect for the non-EU 15 countries at the mean level of external 
finance is negative, implying that the total impact of harmonization on industrial growth is not beneficial.   
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been a part of the EU for a longer period of time and the likely impact of some countries with larger banking 
shares which may potentially bias the results, or due to the fact that there is a difference in terms of timing 
of adoption of the FSAP directives which has to be considered in estimations regarding this link. We have 
shown that EU-15 and Euro countries have a positive coefficient for financial harmonization. Similarly the 
exclusion of countries that have larger banking shares does not alter our initial findings for the negative 
result. The two remaining reasons for the initial negative effect of harmonization on growth thereby are the 
nature of harmonization and its timing. In order to study which one of these competing explanations is 
dominant, we test our results using indices for integration, uniformity and other directives taking into 
account the relative timing of adoption of the FSAP directives in our regressions. The results reported in 
Table 4 show that with the inclusion of the relative timing of adoption, financial harmonization becomes 
positively significant. The results reveal that the negative effect occurs as a result of not accounting for the 
speed of adoption.22  
 
The findings from Table 2, 3 and 4 with the inclusion of the harmonization difference depict that being an 
early adopter could lead to lower growth perspectives for all 25 countries, and for different subgroups of 
countries. In order to correctly examine the impact of early versus late adoption we need to include further 
controls into the model. 
 
Adding controls 
 
Adding further controls may be important to avoid omitted variable bias. Given that we already have 
country, industry and time fixed effects, we focus on controls that are country and time variant. Firstly, in 
order to account for the structural features of the banking systems in European countries, we follow the 
methodology proposed by Kalemli – Ozcan et al. (2010) and use control variables for bank’s overhead 
costs, bank’s profitability and banking concentration from Beck et al.’s Financial Development and 
Structure Database (2000). Given that there exist concerns regarding the implementation of the FSAP and 
its dependence on local conditions of the banking systems, we believe that the inclusion of these variables 
can provide a better picture for the link between harmonization policies and industrial growth. The results, 
not reported here23, do not have any systematic effects on our model. Secondly, in order to account for 
differences in legal, institutional and governmental structures, as well as stock market and overall financial 
development, we include country and time-variant measures in our model.  
 
Table 5 reports the results for the entire sample, EU-15 countries, and non-EU 15 countries when control 
variables for financial and stock market development and legal and institutional quality are used. The short 
period availability of financial development indicators and legal variables reduces our sample size to the 
1996 – 2007 period. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show that, when not controlling for the harmonization 
difference measure, the harmonization index is found to be negatively significant for all countries and for 
non-EU 15 countries and positive but insignificant for EU-15 countries. The inclusion of the harmonization 
difference measure in columns (2), (4) and (6) leads to a change in the sign of harmonization indices.24 The 
coefficients of the interaction terms imply that the simultaneous effect of harmonization and external 
finance dependence has a negative impact on industrial growth. Overall the results depict that 
harmonization is beneficial for all countries conditional on the relative timing of adoption, and with the 
inclusion of further controls that account for outside effects. However, being an early adopter of the FSAP 
directives proves to have a disadvantageous effect on growth. This is now true for all groups of countries, 
though the effect is statistically insignificant for the EU-15 subgroup.   
 
                                                          
22 Further robustness checks using integration, uniformity and other directives with control variables strengthen the 
argument that the relative timing of adoption is the dominant factor behind the initial negative effect of financial 
harmonization on industrial growth. 
23 Please see Supplementary Appendix Table 7 for the results. 
24 The change in the sign occurs for all countries, and for non-EU 15 countries. 
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Legal origins 
 
Lastly, we consider whether the results of our benchmark model alter with the inclusion of legal origins of 
countries. Legal origins refer to the differences across countries in terms of their legal systems which are 
structured according to families of law. Depending on the historical background and development of legal 
families, on the characteristics of the functioning of legal matters, and on distinctive institutions each 
country has a differing legal tradition. As La Porta et al. present in their series of articles (1997, 1998, and 
2008) the most popular legal traditions are the common law and the civil law from which several sub-
traditions such as the French, German, socialist and Scandinavian legal origins arise.25 Although for our 
particular study, there is not much difference between the French, German and British laws that implement 
the EU legislation proposed under the FSAP, the way these provisions will be carried out into the domestic 
law, the manner that the directives will be monitored and enforced may show vast differences across 
member countries. This remains to be a factor too strong to forgo. This implies that together with 
governmental and institutional factors, differences in legal origins across countries may highly influence 
the link between financial harmonization and growth. Our analysis with the addition of legal origins, 
although not reported here, finds the effect of financial harmonization index to be negative but insignificant 
on industrial growth for all countries.26 Once again, the signs of harmonization indices across all countries, 
EU-15 countries, and non-EU 15 countries change when the harmonization difference measure is included 
in the model. Although the legal origin dummies for the U.K., France, Germany, Socialist regimes, and 
Scandinavian countries appear to be significant in some regressions, the results obtained are similar to the 
ones found in the benchmark case, and to those found in Table 3. 
 
4.2. Dynamic panel data model  
 
We include a dynamic panel data model in order to examine the partial adjustment property of 
harmonization policies, to analyze possible long-run effects of harmonization and to determine whether a 
dynamic setting would add to the relationship between harmonization and growth. The results of the 
dynamic panel data model should not be thought to overcast the findings of our benchmark model. Firstly, 
even if governments of countries in the EU anticipate higher growth rates following harmonization, it is 
unlikely that the officials in each industry could determine the timing of adoption in their own country as 
well as in other countries.27 Secondly, and more importantly, if countries harmonize because of expected 
growth, early harmonization should be beneficial. In fact, we find the opposite which we report in the 
following section. 
 
Table 6 depicts the results of 4 different dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM type panel models.  Due to the use 
of control variables, the estimation period is reduced to 1996 – 2007. The lagged dependent variable in 
column (1) has a negative and significant coefficient. The harmonization index in the dynamic panel data 
model is found to have a positively significant effect when the harmonization difference measure and other 
control variables are included in the model. Harmonization difference measure is found to be negative and 
significant. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for EU-15 countries and columns (4) and (5) report the 
results for non-EU 15 countries. In column (2), the lagged dependent variable is negative and significant, 
implying that previous growth perspectives lead to a slowdown in current growth. The variables of interest 
                                                          
25 Please refer to La Porta et al. (2008). Legal origins dummies are obtained from the original La Porta et al. (1998) 
study and they are created by assigning a value of 1 for countries that have a specified legal tradition such as civil or 
common law, and 0 otherwise. 
26 Please see the Supplementary Appendix, Table 8 for the results using controls and legal origins. 
27 Both Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Klenow (1998) argue that there is low correlation across industrial growth 
rates. This low correlation in industrial growth stands as an additional reason for why causality (or the endogeneity 
of harmonization) is not a problem in our analysis. 
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on the other hand are found to have insignificant coefficients.28 Column (4) shows that for non-EU 15 
countries none of the variables of interest is significant. In order to correct for this problem in column (5) 
we report results for non-EU 15 countries with controls using additional instruments.29  Harmonization 
index is then found to be positive and significant. The harmonization difference is also negatively 
significant implying that being an early adopter for non-EU 15 countries is not beneficial. In all estimations 
the Arellano-Bond tests of serial correlation show that we do not have any problems with the error terms in 
our regressions, whereas the Sargan tests do not report over identification problems regarding the 
instruments to be used in the estimation of the model in all columns.30 
 
We have experimented with different control variables that are common to growth regressions. The 
inclusion of secondary school enrollment rate to account for differences in human capital across countries, 
government expenditures, or health expenditures does not alter the results reported by the dynamic panel 
data model.  
 
To analyze the long-run effects of harmonization policies and the interaction term we divide each 
coefficient by 1 – γ, where γ represents the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in our model. The 
results show that the harmonization index has a positive coefficient for growth when we consider its long-
run impact.31 This suggests that, given the shorter sample, and the control variables selected, the effect of 
harmonization will be positive in the long-run. The interaction term has a negative effect on growth, 
suggesting that in the long-run, the benefits of harmonizing in a full sample of European economies may 
not work through the simultaneous effect of external finance dependence of industries. Overall, the results 
of interest confirm our findings from the benchmark model in that harmonization has a positive effect on 
growth once we take into account the harmonization difference measure and other controls.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Starting with the adoption of the Euro in 1999, the European Union has taken initiatives in building a more 
integrated and harmonized financial market among its member states. With the establishment of the 
                                                          
28 Column (3) uses government effectiveness and deposit money bank assets to central bank assets ratio as additional 
instruments. The inclusion of these variables as instruments does not bring significant changes to our estimations. 
29 The instruments used in the dynamic panel data model estimations fall under two categories; GMM and IV type 
instruments. GMM type instruments consist of endogenous variables such as the lagged dependent or explanatory 
variables. IV type instruments on the other hand are explanatory variables that are exogenous as well as additional 
set of instruments which are not part of the original equation. All columns use the 4th lag of the logarithm of gross 
value added in levels as GMM type instruments; whereas columns (1), (2) and (3) use political stability measure 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset, lag of the harmonization index, lag of the interaction term, and 
time dummies as IV type instruments. Column (4) in addition to these IV type instruments uses the ratio of deposit 
money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank and central bank assets, stock market turnover ratio, and 
government effectiveness as instruments. For a further explanation of the variables please refer to the 
Supplementary Appendix. We make use of political stability as an instrument due to its exogeneity with industrial 
growth. Our estimations including this variable as a control does not depict significant results, which then 
strengthens our argument for using it as an instrument. 
30 The lags of instruments used for the dynamic panel data model specification are of vital importance. Due to the 
static nature of the problem, using a dynamic panel data model with an incorrect specification can bias our findings. 
In order to account for this we experiment with various lag structures and instruments. 
31 The EU-15 countries have a negative coefficient for harmonization that is insignificant in column (3) and a 
positive but insignificant coefficient in column (4). We believe that this alteration can be a result of the instruments 
selected in the analysis. Given that the coefficients are insignificant in either case we restrain from concluding that 
the long-run impact of harmonization in EU-15 countries is negative or positive.  
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Financial Services Action Plan, the European Commission has taken a further step to integrate the European 
countries through legislative and regulatory terms in banking, insurance and securities markets. 
 
Since the goal of the FSAP is to enhance growth in Europe, this paper has assessed whether this has been 
the case or not. When using a standard specification --- regressing growth on harmonization controlling for 
country, industry and time fixed effects --- we find that harmonization did not have the expected effect. 
Instead, growth seems to have been negatively impacted by the introduction of the FSAP. However, this 
standard specification, used in other papers on financial deregulation and harmonization, fails to control for 
an important factor: the relative timing of adoption. Indeed, we would only expect harmonization to be 
beneficial if all countries adopt the directives. That is, adopting when others do not, would not imply true 
harmonization, putting early adopters at a disadvantage. Once we control for the relative timing of adoption, 
we find that harmonization has the expected positive effect on growth, whereas being an early adopter 
(mostly) has a negative effect. These results are shown to be robust to including different controls, splitting 
up the sample into different subgroups of countries, and extending the model to a dynamic specification.  
 
This paper suggests several promising areas of future research. First, as time passes, and more data become 
available for a longer time period, a more in-depth dynamic analysis of the impact of the FSAP could be 
carried out. Of particular interest would be to see whether the different behavior of the non-EU 15 
countries32 that we uncovered gets mitigated over time. Second, our paper has gone beyond the simple 
cross-country analysis common to many studies by including industrial data. A next natural step would be 
to use firm-level data. Doing so would allow us to better measure the interaction between the impact of the 
FSAP and the dependence on external finance at the firm-level. Third, our paper shows that the relative 
timing of adoption is key to understand the impact of harmonization policies on growth. This suggests that 
controlling for this relative timing should be useful for other studies that have analyzed the impact of 
deregulation or harmonization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Another topic of interest is to uncover the channels that affect the EU-15 countries and explain their different 
behavior in some of our estimations. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Financial harmonization and industrial growth 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
    
Log of Gross Value Added (Lagged)  -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** 
 (-5.029) (-5.027) (-4.976) 
 [0.00256] [0.00256] [0.00258] 
Harmonization -0.0105   
 (-1.323)   
 [0.00795]   
Harmonization interaction 0.0144*   
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.804)   
 [0.00799]   
Harmonization*  -0.0110  
(21 directives)  (-1.371)  
  [0.00805]  
Harmonization* interaction  0.0145*  
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.784)  
  [0.00812]  
Harmonization**   -0.0250*** 
(7 directives)   (-2.628) 
   [0.00950] 
Harmonization** interaction   0.0225* 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗ × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.677) 
   [0.0134] 
    
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 
     
 25 
 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth is equal 
to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is calculated as 
GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 1 
on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. Harmonizationi,t* = ln 
(1 + lexroi,t ) where lexroi,t represents the sum of all 21 directives excluding the 6 directives implemented after 2003. Harmonization i,t** = ln (1 + 
banklexi,t) where banklexi,t represents the sum of all 7 banking directives. exf is the external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in levels. The regressions are estimated over 25 
countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. The estimation period in our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects 
that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 2: Financial harmonization and industrial growth; new specifications with indices 
 
        
 Dependent Variables 
      
 All countries EU-15 Euro Non-EU 15 All countries 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
        
Log of Gross Value Added  -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.00894*** -0.0103*** -0.0274*** -0.0129*** 
(Lagged) (-5.004) (-4.996) (-4.990) (-3.355) (-3.763) (-3.736) (-5.029) 
 [0.00257] [0.00257] [0.00256] [0.00266] [0.00274] [0.00733] [0.00256] 
Harmonization    0.0176** 0.0234*** -0.0233* 0.0280*** 
    (2.375) (2.971) (-1.748) (6.133) 
    [0.00739] [0.00788] [0.0133] [0.00456] 
Harmonization interaction    0.00421 0.00648 0.0134 0.0144* 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)    (0.596) (0.811) (0.591) (1.804) 
    [0.00707] [0.00798] [0.0227] [0.00799] 
Harmonizationdif       -0.0385*** 
       (-4.168) 
       [0.00923] 
        
Harmonization -0.00457       
(Integration directives) (-0.511)       
 [0.00893]       
Harmonization interaction 0.0221*       
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.834)       
(Integration directives) [0.0121]       
        
Harmonization  -0.0153*      
(Uniformity directives)  (-1.848)      
  [0.00826]      
Harmonization interaction  0.0175      
 27 
 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.615)      
(Uniformity directives)  [0.0108]      
        
Harmonization   -0.00119     
(Other directives)   (-0.151)     
   [0.00783]     
Harmonization interaction   0.0207     
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.472)     
(Other directives)   [0.0141]     
        
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 14,048 11,049 3,332 17,380 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.116 0.098 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth is 
equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is calculated 
as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 
1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external 
finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. The first three columns report the results for an industrial 
composition of financial harmonization directives. The FSAP directives are grouped under three categories; integration, uniformity and others. The 
construction of the indices follows the original calculations discussed in Section 2. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value 
added in levels. The regressions in the first three columns are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 37 years. The 25 European Union 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Column (4) is estimated over 15 countries, 
30 industries and 37 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Column (5) is estimated over 12 euro countries and 37 years. The 12 euro countries are: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Column (6) is estimated over 10 countries, 30 
industries and 37 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia.  Column (7) includes all countries in the sample and is estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The estimation period in 
our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in 
the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of financial harmonization policies across European countries 
 
The figure above is generated in Stata and depicts the graphs for the harmonization index that is constructed using 27 directives of the Financial 
Services Action Plan and the harmonization average indicator which is the mean value of the harmonization index of 25 European countries per each 
year in our sample size. 
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Table 3: Financial harmonization and industrial growth; additional robustness checks 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
        
 EU-15 Euro Non-EU 15 No Latvia or Poland No Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, or U.K. 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
        
Log of Gross Value Added -0.00894*** -0.0103*** -0.0274*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0110*** -0.0110*** 
(Lagged) (-3.355) (-3.763) (-3.736) (-4.748) (-4.748) (-3.990) (-3.990) 
 [0.00266] [0.00274] [0.00733] [0.00260] [0.00260] [0.00276] [0.00276] 
Harmonization 0.0217*** 0.0245*** 0.00979 -0.0143* 0.0285*** -0.00856 0.0255*** 
 (5.093) (5.192) (1.101) (-1.671) (6.159) (-1.020) (5.383) 
 [0.00427] [0.00473] [0.00889] [0.00854] [0.00463] [0.00840] [0.00473] 
Harmonization interaction 0.00421 0.00648 0.0134 0.0125 0.0125 0.0140 0.0140 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (0.596) (0.811) (0.591) (1.541) (1.541) (1.618) (1.618) 
 [0.00707] [0.00798] [0.0227] [0.00811] [0.00811] [0.00865] [0.00865] 
Harmonizationdif -0.00420 -0.00115 -0.0330**  -0.0428***  -0.0340*** 
 (-0.484) (-0.123) (-2.298)  (-4.391)  (-3.584) 
 [0.00868] [0.00931] [0.0144]  [0.00974]  [0.00950] 
        
Observations 14,048 11,049 3,332 16,745 16,745 15,182 15,182 
R-squared 0.111 0.123 0.116 0.098 0.098 0.101 0.101 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth is 
equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is calculated 
as GVAGRO = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 
1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exf  is the external 
finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
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where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across countries per year. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value 
added in levels. Column (1) is estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Column (2) is estimated over 12 euro 
countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 12 euro countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Column (3) is estimated over 10 countries, 30 industries and 37 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  Columns (4) and (5) are estimated over 23 countries, 
30 industries and 37 years, excluding Latvia and Poland. Finally columns (6) and (7) are estimated over 21 countries, 30 industries and 37 years excluding 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and the U.K. The estimation period in our regressions is 1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and 
time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 4: Financial harmonization and industrial growth; competing explanations 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
    
Log of Gross value added (Lagged) -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** 
 (-5.004) (-4.996) (-4.990) 
 [0.00257 [0.00257] [0.00256] 
Harmonization 0.0368***   
(Integration directives) (6.029)   
 [0.00611]   
Harmonization interaction 0.0221*   
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (1.834)   
(Integration directives) [0.0121]   
Harmonizationdif -0.0414***   
(Integration directives) (-3.804)   
 [0.0109]   
    
Harmonization  0.0409***  
(Uniformity Directives)  (6.196)  
  [0.00660]  
Harmonization interaction  0.0175  
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)  (1.615)  
(Uniformity directives)  [0.0108]  
Harmonizationdif  -0.0562***  
(Uniformity directives)  (-5.148)  
  [0.0109]  
    
Harmonization   0.0488*** 
(Other directives)   (6.569) 
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   [0.00743] 
Harmonization interaction   0.0207 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓)   (1.472) 
(Other directives)   [0.0141] 
Harmonizationdif   -0.0500*** 
(Other directives)   (-4.399) 
   [0.0114] 
    
Observations 17,380 17,380 17,380 
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.098 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth is 
equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is calculated 
as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 
1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external 
finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. The first three columns report the results for an industrial 
composition of financial harmonization directives. The FSAP directives are grouped under three categories; integration, uniformity and others. The 
construction of the indices follows the original calculations discussed in Section 2. The above estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value 
added in levels. The regressions in the first three columns are estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries, and 37 years. The 25 European Union 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. The estimation period in our regressions is 
1971 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based 
on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 5: Financial harmonization and industrial growth; adding further controls 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
    
 All countries EU-15 countries Non-EU 15 countries 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
       
Log of Gross Value Added -0.0103*** -0.0103*** 0.000459 0.000459 -0.0262*** -0.0262*** 
(Lagged) (-2.623) (-2.623) (0.113) (0.113) (-3.120) (-3.120) 
 [0.00393] [0.00393] [0.00407] [0.00407] [0.00838] [0.00838] 
Harmonization -0.0160* 0.0832*** 0.0106 0.0512 -0.0310** 0.0606 
 (-1.780) (2.804) (1.236) (0.933) (-2.290) (1.475) 
 [0.00897] [0.0297] [0.00855] [0.0548] [0.0136] [0.0411] 
Harmonization interaction    -0.00591 -0.00591 -0.0164* -0.0164*         0.0168     0.0168 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (-0.576) (-0.576) (-1.654) (-1.654) (0.779) (0.779) 
 [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.00991] [0.00991] [0.0216] [0.0216] 
Harmonizationdif  -0.0992***  -0.0406  -0.0916** 
  (-3.268)  (-0.734)  (-2.212) 
  [0.0304]  [0.0553]  [0.0414] 
Bank assets ratio -0.205** -0.205** -0.0678 -0.0678 -0.249** -0.249** 
 (-2.482) (-2.482) (-0.427) (-0.427) (-2.551) (-2.551) 
 [0.0826] [0.0826] [0.159] [0.159] [0.0975] [0.0975] 
Turnover ratio -0.0116* -0.0116* 0.00751 0.00751 -0.0147 -0.0147 
 (-1.670) (-1.670) (1.178) (1.178) (-1.227) (-1.227) 
 [0.00696] [0.00696] [0.00638] [0.00638] [0.0120] [0.0120] 
Government effectiveness 0.0376*** 0.0376*** 0.0219* 0.0219* 0.0458 0.0458 
 (3.151) (3.151) (1.841) (1.841) (1.204) (1.204) 
 [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0380] [0.0380] 
Regulatory quality 0.0855*** 0.0855*** 0.0504* 0.0504* 0.106* 0.106* 
 (3.147) (3.147) (1.961) (1.961) (1.837) (1.837) 
 [0.0272] [0.0272] [0.0257] [0.0257] [0.0575] [0.0575] 
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Rule of law -0.0682*** -0.0682*** -0.0795*** -0.0795*** -0.0775* -0.0775* 
 (-2.929) (-2.929) (-2.849) (-2.849) (-1.935) (-1.935) 
 [0.0233] [0.0233] [0.0279] [0.0279] [0.0401] [0.0401] 
       
Observations 7,012 7,012 4,134 4,134 2,878 2,878 
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.119 0.119 
 
Note: t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth is 
equal to the gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is calculated 
as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1).  Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on a value of 
1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the external 
finance dependence of U.S. firms in the 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 −
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡  is the average harmonization across countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit 
money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The above 
estimations include the lagged logarithm of gross value added in levels. The regressions in columns (1) – (2) are estimated over 25 countries, 30 
industries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the U.K. Columns (3) – (4) are estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Columns (5) – (6) are estimated over 10 
countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. The above estimations include country, industry, and time 
effects that are not reported here. t – statistics reported in the tables are based on country and industry-specific (clustered) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 6: Financial harmonization and industrial growth; Arellano – Bond dynamic panel estimation with further 
controls 
   
   
  Dependent Variables 
     
 All countries EU-15 countries Non-EU 15 countries 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO GVAGRO 
      
Gross Value Added Growth -0.936*** -0.765* -0.785* -0.457 -0.329 
(Lagged) (-3.299) (-1.648) (-1.676) (-1.379) (-1.007) 
 [0.284] [0.464] [0.469] [0.332] [0.327] 
Harmonization 0.207** -0.0144 0.000137 0.0205 0.0448* 
 (2.101) (-0.245) (0.00799) (0.345) (1.714) 
 [0.0987] [0.0588] [0.0172] [0.0596] [0.0262] 
Harmonization interaction -0.131 -0.0671 -0.0509 -0.214 -0.245 
(𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑥𝑓) (-1.174) (-0.687) (-0.646) (-1.338) (-1.571) 
 [0.112] [0.0976] [0.0787] [0.160] [0.156] 
Harmonizationdif -0.350** -0.00893 -0.0189 0.0339 -0.296*** 
 (-2.382) (-0.114) (-0.281) (0.129) (-2.830) 
 [0.147] [0.0781] [0.0673] [0.262] [0.105] 
Bank assets -11.99** -0.990 -1.354 0.189 -0.956 
 (-2.221) (-0.245) (-1.225) (0.0913) (-1.414) 
 [5.399] [4.046] [1.105] [2.065] [0.677] 
Turnover ratio 0.00177 -0.0134 -0.0275 0.0599 -0.0637 
 (0.0318) (-0.238) (-0.426) (0.376) (-0.591) 
 [0.0557] [0.0565] [0.0645] [0.159] [0.108] 
Government Effectiveness 0.236*** -0.0115 -0.00219 0.924 0.169 
 (2.719) (-0.157) (-0.0671) (1.559) (1.444) 
 [0.0866] [0.0733] [0.0326] [0.593] [0.117] 
Regulatory quality -0.290 0.592 0.535** -0.0382 -0.226 
 (-0.681) (1.578) (2.497) (-0.0545) (-0.444) 
 36 
 
 [0.426] [0.375] [0.214] [0.701] [0.508] 
Rule of law 0.890 -0.205 -0.179 -0.636 -0.329 
 (1.577) (-0.428) (-0.640) (-1.289) (-0.704) 
 [0.564] [0.480] [0.280] [0.494] [0.468] 
      
Observations 6,134 3,544 3,380 2,590 2,561 
Number of groups 708 424 403 284 284 
AB test for AR(1) (p value) 0.73 -0.21 -0.14 -1.04 -0.91 
 (0.464) (0.837) (0.885) (0.300) (0.365) 
AB test for AR(2) (p value) -0.72 -1.66 -1.60 -1.15 -1.13 
 (0.470) (0.097) (0.109) (0.251) (0.259) 
Sargan test 0.203 0.177 0.505 0.060 0.027 
Hansen test 0.367 0.401 0.622 0.115 0.192 
 
 
Note: Robust t – statistics are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are in brackets. GVAGRO = Gross value added growth 
is equal to the Gross value added which is adjusted by the gross value added price indices, 1995 = 100 from the EU KLEMS database. GVAGRO is 
calculated as GVAGRO = log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡) − log (𝑔𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1). Harmonizationi,t = ln (1 + lexi,t ) where lexi,t represents the sum of all 27 directives which take on 
a value of 1 on and after the date that the directive under consideration goes into effect in that particular country, and a value of 0 otherwise. exf is the 
external finance dependence of U.S. firms in 1970s calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 −
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡 is the average harmonization across countries per year. Bank assets ratio is the ratio of deposit 
money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, Turnover ratio is stock market turnover ratio, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality and Rule of law are legal and institutional variables taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Regression in 
column (1) is estimated over 25 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The 25 European Union countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. Column (2) is estimated over 15 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The EU-15 countries are: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.  Columns 
(3) and (4) are estimated over 10 countries, 30 industries and 12 years. The 10 non-EU 15 countries included are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The estimation period in our regressions is 1996 – 2007. All regressions are estimated 
using the Arellano – Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation with one lag of the dependent variable to be included in the model. All columns use the 4th 
lag of the logarithm of gross value added as GMM type instruments. Columns (1), (2) and (4) use political stability measure from World Governance 
Indicators dataset, first lag of the harmonization index, first lag of the interaction term and the time dummies as IV type instruments. Column (3) in 
addition to these IV type instruments employs the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank and central bank assets, and 
government effectiveness as instruments, and column (5) introduces the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit money bank and 
central bank assets, and government effectiveness and stock market turnover ratio as instruments. The results reported here use the one-step 
estimator. (The estimations use the Stata xtabond2 command).  
 
